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Waivering About the Dirty Business of 
Plea Bargains—A Comment 
Jonathan Shapiro* 
Praise to Leanna Minix for untangling the twisted paths 
federal courts have blazed, which all lead to the same dead end. 
Ms. Minix hacked through the undergrowth of Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 111—the rule governing what judges must do 
to ensure that a defendant’s guilty plea will survive later 
scrutiny—and shined a light on the ways different circuits have 
chosen to accomplish that task. As she has convincingly 
demonstrated, most circuits employ overly narrow tests for 
evaluating claimed violations of one of the most controversial, yet 
now “standard” provisions in federal plea bargains—waiver of the 
right to appeal.2 
The federal courts have made quick work of most attempts by 
defendants to review the results of plea bargains that turned out 
to be no bargain. This is most frequently the case when the 
sentence a defendant fully and justifiably believed he would get 
turns out to have been just a fond wish. Courts are able to evade 
a higher level of scrutiny on review because of the restrictive 
Dominguez-Benitez test,3 which holds that a defendant who failed 
to object to a faulty Rule 11 colloquy is barred from appealing 
unless he shows “a reasonable probability that, but for the error, 
he would not have entered the plea.”4 
Use of this test is particularly troubling when the bargain 
requires the defendant to waive his appeal rights, which in the 
context of a guilty plea boils down to a single right—the statutory 
right to have an appellate court review the propriety of the 
                                                                                                     
 * Visiting Professor of Law at Washington and Lee University School of 
Law and partner in Greenspun Shapiro, P.C., a northern Virginia law firm. 
 1. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. 
 2. Id. 11(b)(1)(N). 
 3. United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 (2004). 
 4. Id. at 83. 
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sentence, within strict limits.5 There is no appeal from any other 
aspect of the prosecution (e.g. bad searches, bad wire-taps, bad 
interrogations). All other claims are automatically waived once 
the defendant pleads guilty. Nevertheless, as Ms. Minix notes, all 
the circuits have held allegedly “bargained-for” appellate waivers 
constitutional, and Rule 11(b)(1)(N) “green-lights” the practice by 
requiring that the court specifically address that waiver in the 
plea colloquy. When a defendant waives appellate rights, there is 
no relief when the court imposes an unexpected sentence. But 
taken to its extreme, a valid appellate waiver might even bar 
claims that the plea was not voluntarily and intelligently made, 
which is a constitutional baseline in the world of guilty plea 
jurisprudence.6  
Given this sorry state of affairs, Ms. Minix’s suggestion that 
the courts explicitly adopt an expanded test for reviewing a 
                                                                                                     
 5. This right is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2016) as a part of the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. The provision states, in pertinent part: 
(a) Appeal by a defendant. A defendant may file a notice of appeal in 
the district court for review of an otherwise final sentence if the 
sentence— 
(1) was imposed in violation of law; 
(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the 
sentencing guidelines; or 
(3) is greater than the sentence specified in the applicable guideline 
range to the extent that the sentence includes a greater fine or term 
of imprisonment, probation, or supervised release than the maximum 
established in the guideline range, or includes a more limiting 
condition of probation or supervised release under section 3563(b)(6) 
or (b)(11) [18 USCS § 3563(b)(6) or (b)(11)] than the maximum 
established in the guideline range; or 
(4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no sentencing 
guideline and is plainly unreasonable. 
Section 3742 allows the government to appeal a sentence, and further allows 
defendants to appeal when the sentence imposed exceeded a specific sentence 
set out in the plea agreement under Rule 11(e)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. Id. §§ 3742(b)–(c). 
 6. See United States v. Mutschler, 152 F. Supp. 3d 1332, 1337 (W.D. 
Wash. 2016) (“Almost all of the circuits have concluded that, absent some 
egregious circumstance or a miscarriage of justice, a unilateral waiver of the 
right to appeal is enforceable . . . .” (emphasis added)); see, e.g., United States v. 
Guillen, 561 F.3d 527, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (noting that a waiver is invalid if the 
district court “utterly fails” to apply proper sentencing factors, if the sentence 
exceeds the statutory maximum, or if the sentence was based on race or 
religion). 
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defendant’s un-objected-to failure of the trial court to ensure the 
defendant understands he is giving up his right to appeal is, in a 
word, appealing. Her test adds to the Dominguez-Benitez test by 
requiring appellate courts ensure the defendant’s waiver is 
voluntarily and intelligently made.  
Of course, a quick review of the cases shows what should be 
no surprise. Courts are extremely hostile to efforts to undo guilty 
pleas. Expanding the test governing un-objected-to, faulty 
colloquies about appellate waiver will bring needed uniformity, as 
Ms. Minix argues, but may still not lead to relief for an aggrieved 
defendant. The larger problem is the gross unfairness of modern 
federal plea bargaining itself. 
___________________ 
How is it that the plea-bargaining industry is so unfair? And 
why is it that forcing a defendant to waive her rights to appeal a 
sentence is so unjust? The thoughts in this Comment are not 
intended to thoroughly address what I perceive to be the 
underlying problems with plea bargaining as it exists today. 
Rather, they reflect my quick take on the issue based on my own 
experience as a lawyer who has spent the past forty-two years 
representing those charged with federal offenses and negotiating 
with federal prosecutors. Others have written extensively on the 
legal underpinnings of plea bargaining in the modern age, and I 
recommend their works to you.7  
As preface, it is my belief—a belief shared by many criminal 
defense lawyers—that in the modern era, plea bargaining is a 
sham. Bargaining implies that the parties come to the table 
operating with the same set of rules. Each side may have 
                                                                                                     
 7. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of 
Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2465 (2004) (arguing that the common 
justification for plea bargaining, the “shadow-of-trial model is, however, far too 
simplistic”); Richard Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 
YALE L.J. 1979, 1980 (1992) (arguing that “the structural flaws [of the plea 
bargaining system] impair both due process and crime control values”); Ken 
Strutin, Truth, Justice, and the American Style Plea Bargain, 77 ALB. L. REV. 
825, 829 (2014) (examining “Supreme Court plea bargaining decisions” and 
“their implications for the competing goals of truth versus process”); Robert E. 
Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 
1967 (1992) (“Though it has long been understood that plea bargaining is a 
species of contract, the debate about it has been framed not in the language of 
bargains, but chiefly the language of rights.”). 
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certain factual, legal, or moral advantages that may sway the 
other’s position. But the framework for negotiation is neutral. 
That is not the case in the federal criminal justice system.  
It is probably old news that the Sentencing Reform Act of 
19848 drastically changed the playing field for defense lawyers, 
and with it the landscape for citizens charged with federal 
offenses.9 Before that law ushered in the era of determinate 
sentencing, judges were free to sentence as they deemed proper 
anywhere within the upper and lower penalty limits established 
by Congress. Sentencing hearings could take hours or a full day 
as defense lawyers called family members, neighbors, school 
teachers, co-workers, doctors, and others to testify about the 
defendant’s background, good works, and prospects. Sentencing 
experts offered sentencing plans involving community service, 
restitution, alternative incarceration, and any number of creative 
alternatives to a lengthy prison term. Because of the great 
discretion available to judges, the pressure to plead guilty was 
reduced. It is true that there were incentives to avoid trial, and 
that most defendants did end up negotiating some sort of plea 
bargain. But it was also true that in many cases, there was little 
to be lost by going to trial. If found guilty, a defendant could still 
make the arguments that he would have made at trial and that 
the sentencing judge would have considered after a plea of guilty.  
The sentencing guidelines swept all that aside. The infamous 
Sentencing Table10 and the command of the Sentencing Reform 
Act of 1984 made judges largely irrelevant because, with 
extremely minor exceptions, a sentence falls within a particular 
range based on a mechanical calculus of sentencing factors.11 At 
                                                                                                     
 8. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2016). 
 9. See generally Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing 
Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 223 (1993); Stanley A. Weigel, The Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984: A Practical Appraisal, 36 UCLA L. REV. 83 (1988). 
 10. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2016). 
 11. Indeed, the harshness of the sentencing guidelines led at least one 
federal judge to resign. See Criticizing Sentencing Rules, U.S. Judge Resigns, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/30/us/criticizing-
sentencing-rules-us-judge-resigns.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2017) (quoting U.S. 
District Judge J. Lawrence Irving as saying, “If I remain on the bench I have no 
choice but to follow the law . . . . I just can’t, in good conscience, continue to do 
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the same time, it made federal prosecutors extraordinarily 
powerful in dictating what sentence a defendant would receive, 
by way of unreviewable charging decisions.12 The guidelines 
specifically removed from consideration many of the factors that 
had been the centerpiece of pre-guidelines sentencing 
arguments.13 I have often heard judges rue the sentence they 
were forced to impose, call it irrational or unjust, then direct that 
the nineteen-year-old, non-violent, first-offender crack defendant 
who stood before the court serve 240 months in prison.14 
                                                                                                     
this”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Other judges simply 
refused to impose the required sentence. See, e.g., Timothy Williams, Judge 
Refuses to Set Sentence for Ex-Crack Dealer, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 19, 1996), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1996-03-19/local/me-48652_1_sentencing-guidelines 
(last visited Feb. 3, 2017) (describing U.S. District Court Judge Terry J. Hatter 
of the Central District of California as declaring, “I will not be a party to this 
injustice . . . . Congress cannot make me do this; the president cannot make me 
do this”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 12. As noted by U.S. District Judge John Coughenour of the Western 
District of Washington: “So much of sentencing discretion is vested now in the 
U.S. Attorney’s Office. By their charging decisions, they can tie the hands of the 
sentencing judge, particularly on mandatory minimums. And [prosecutors’] 
discretion, by the way, is exercised in darkness . . . . In fact, we are precluded 
from reviewing those charging decisions.” Matthew Van Meter, One Judge 
Makes the Case for Judgment, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 25, 2016), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/ politics/archive/2016/02/one-judge-makes-the-case-
for-judgment/463380/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2017) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). The prosecution does not deny this reality. The Atlantic 
article continues: “Mark Osler, a law professor who worked as a prosecutor in 
Detroit in the 1990s, says: ‘I had all the power. It was about whether I filed a 
notice of enhancement or gave points for acceptance of responsibility. It’s not 
reviewable. It’s within the discretion of the prosecutor.’” Id. 
 13. Guidelines Chapter 5, Part H, titled “Specific Offender Characteristics”, 
places limits on, and in some cases bars consideration of, many traditional 
sentencing factors such as education, vocational skills, employment record, 
family ties and responsibilities, community ties, age, mental and emotional 
conditions, physical condition, drug or alcohol dependence or abuse, gambling 
addiction, military, civic, charitable, or public service, employment-related 
contributions, or record of prior good works. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL ch. 5, pt. H (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).  
 14. I particularly recall the pained face of the Honorable Albert V. Bryan, 
Jr., of the Eastern District of Virginia, after calculating a young defendant’s 
sentencing guidelines and arriving at a horribly inappropriate yet mandated 
sentencing range. The judge then said, “With that as bleak background, I’ll hear 
what you have to say, Mr. Shapiro, as to where within the range the sentence 
ought to fall.” 
612 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 607 (2017) 
The harsh Sentencing Table and uncompromising sentencing 
enhancements did not work the sea change in criminal justice 
alone. They were aided and abetted by two other changes in the 
law that conspire by vastly increasing the pressure to waive trial 
and plead guilty. Those changes were Congress’s imposition of 
extreme mandatory minimum sentences15 and Section 5K1.1 of 
the Sentencing Guidelines.16 Together, they are the one-two 
punch (more accurately, a punch and a push) that knocks a 
defense attorney out of the ring.  
The “punch” is the advent of mandatory minimum sentences. 
There is recognition today from all corners that many of the 
                                                                                                     
 15. Mandatory minimum sentences are established by Congress, not the 
Sentencing Commission. HISTORY OF MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES AND 
STATUTORY RELIEF MECHANISMS 1, 29, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-
reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/20111031-rtc-pdf/Chapter_02.pdf 
(describing Congress’s authority to mandate minimum sentences as dating back 
to 1790 and still in effect); see also Justin Sink, Obama Calls on Congress to 
Overhaul Mandatory Minimum Sentences, BLOOMBERG (July 14, 2015, 6:22 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-14/obama-calls-on-congress-
to-overhaul-mandatory-minimum-sentences (last visited Feb. 3, 2017) 
(describing the president’s call to Congress to minimize heavy sentencing for 
non-violent drug offenders) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 16. Section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, titled “Substantial 
Assistance to Authorities” states: 
Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has 
provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of 
another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart 
from the guidelines. 
(a)    The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for 
reasons stated that may include, but are not limited to, consideration 
of the following: 
(1)    the court’s evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the 
defendant’s assistance, taking into consideration the government’s 
evaluation of the assistance rendered; 
(2)   the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information 
or testimony provided by the defendant; 
(3)    the nature and extent of the defendant’s assistance; 
(4)    any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the 
defendant or his family resulting from his assistance; 
(5)    the timeliness of the defendant’s assistance. 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2016). 
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mandatory minimum sentences enacted by Congress were wildly 
harsh. For years, the Sentencing Commission itself urged 
Congress to repeal the mandatory minimum drug laws, arguing 
that they hindered application of the sentencing guidelines 
approach.17 Today, even traditional law-and-order voices in 
Congress and elsewhere have come to understand that change is 
required.18 Still, though progress has been made, thousands of 
low-level, non-violent drug offenders caught up in the old system 
wait for the president to grant them relief by way of pardon.  
While the mandatory minimum sentence is often severe, it is 
often not the only bad news for the defendant. The Sentencing 
Guidelines require upward adjustment of sentencing ranges 
based upon a number of factors.19 For example, in drug cases, as 
the total weight of the drug increases, so does the guideline 
range.20 In addition, if the judge finds that the defendant played 
more than a minor role in the scheme, the guidelines may 
increase. If the defendant obstructed justice in any of the myriad 
ways recognized by the guidelines—for example, urging a co-
conspirator not to talk or disposing of drug debt notes—the 
guidelines may increase. If the defendant possessed a firearm, 
                                                                                                     
 17. See, e.g., Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on 
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 111th Cong. 16 (2009) (Statement of 
Ricardo H. Hinojosa, Acting Chair, United States Sentencing Commission), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-
reports/testimony/20090521_Hinojosa_Testimony.pdf (urging reduction of the 
mandatory minimum sentence structure relating to crack cocaine). 
 18. See Criminal Justice Reform, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, https://www.white 
house.gov/issues/criminal-justice-reform (last visited Dec. 28, 2016) (detailing 
the White House’s policy position on “making our criminal justice system more 
fair”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Alex Altman, Koch 
Brother Teams Up With Liberals on Criminal Justice Reform, TIME (Jan. 29, 
2015), http://time.com/3686797/charles-koch-criminal-justice/?iid=sr-link1 (last 
visited Feb. 3 2017) (reporting on bipartisan cooperation for criminal justice 
reform) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 19. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 3–5 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2016). 
 20. Law enforcement agents, well aware of the increased sentences 
available based on the total weight of drugs sold during the scheme, often make 
multiple buys from a defendant for the sole purpose of raising the eventual 
sentence. Courts often reject defense claims that this is improper “sentencing 
entrapment.” See United States v. Watkins, 179 F.3d 489, 503 n.14 (6th Cir. 
1999) (“We note that this court has yet to acknowledge that sentencing 
entrapment, even if proven, constitutes a valid basis for a downward 
departure.”). 
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the guidelines increase. A prior record causes the guidelines to 
increase, as does the fact that a defendant committed the crime 
within a certain period of time after release from prison.21 
The mandatory minimum sentence, which often increases 
based on factors like those outlined above, then sets the stage for 
plea bargaining. Faced with a harsh sentence that the defendant 
cannot avoid if he is convicted at trial, defendants—particularly 
young defendants faced with ten year minimums, or even greater 
sentences—face tremendous pressure to plead guilty if there is 
any way that such a plea could somehow reduce prison time.  
After the “punch” comes the “push,” because there is a way to 
avoid the harshest sentence. Section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing 
Guidelines dangles a life-preserver in front of the defendant. This 
provision allows the defendant to avoid any mandatory minimum 
sentence and to avoid the effect of the guideline’s sentencing 
calculations, in return for “substantial assistance” to the 
government in its investigation of others.22 If the defendant 
agrees to cooperate by telling the government everything he 
knows concerning the crime with which he is charged, as well as 
all unrelated criminal activity, the government may file papers 
asking the judge to sentence him below what would otherwise be 
required, even below the otherwise mandatory minimum sentence.  
The prospect of relief from harsh mandatory minimums and 
multiple enhancements under the Sentencing Guidelines proves 
too much for most defendants to walk away from. Quite the 
opposite. There is often a race to the prosecutor’s office once word 
hits the street that an investigation is under way. Prosecutors 
make it quite clear that the first in line will receive the largest 
reward, and that the benefit to each subsequent cooperator will 
diminish, then vanish.  
The race to the prosecutor has had a major effect on the role 
of defense attorneys in at least three ways. First, required 
investigation and discovery take a back seat to the need to get in 
                                                                                                     
 21. The sentencing guidelines are much more Byzantine than these few 
examples illustrate. They also allow for reductions in the sentencing range 
based on certain factors. But in many cases, even if the calculation yields a 
sentencing range below the mandatory minimum, the court has no authority to 
ignore that minimum. 
 22. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (detailing the substantial 
assistance provision of the Sentencing Guidelines). 
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early. Even when a plea bargain rather than trial is the 
overwhelmingly correct choice to make, it is elementary that an 
attorney armed with knowledge of all the facts—the strengths 
and weaknesses of the evidence, of the witnesses, of the legal 
basis for the charge—is in the best position to reach the best deal. 
Knowledge is power. And as they say, you do not want to go to a 
gun fight with a knife. But in the rush to get in early, all that is 
pushed to the side. Taking time to investigate the government’s 
case means that some other defendant will be sitting with the 
prosecutor first.  
Second, defense attorneys become advocates for the 
government. Fear of the horrendous result that can flow from 
moving cautiously, investigating, and preparing (not to mention 
going to trial), pushes attorneys to push their clients to cooperate. 
Attorneys often may not give their clients comprehensive advice 
about the trial option, in many cases because the defense 
attorney does not even have the facts upon which to base a 
competent assessment. 
Third, defense attorneys are often forced to push their clients 
to the limit in their cooperation with the government. Here is a 
common situation: the defendant and his attorney sit with the 
prosecutor and the FBI agent who headed up the investigation. 
The defendant tells them what he knows. Either because he 
believes (perhaps incorrectly) that the defendant is holding back 
information, or because it is a ploy, the agent declares that the 
defendant is not revealing everything, or that what the defendant 
has told him does not square with the facts that the government 
already knows. The defense attorney asks to speak with her 
client alone. The attorney reminds the client that unless the 
government believes he has revealed all he knows, there will be 
no deal. The attorney asks, “Is it possible that the package 
weighed two kilos, like the agent says, rather than one?” The 
defendant says that yes, it is possible. When questioning begins 
again, the defendant says, “Well, it likely was two kilos—I was 
mistaken about that.” 
The intense pressure to please the government flows from 
the provision in Section 5K1.1 that ties sentencing relief to a 
request from the government. That is, unless the government, in 
its sole discretion, asks the court to give the defendant the benefit 
of Section 5K1.1, the defendant will get no benefit. The defense 
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has no power to even make the request. It is also true that even 
when the defendant cooperated fully and told the government 
truthfully everything he knows, the government is never 
obligated to seek sentencing relief for him. The government may 
say, “Thanks for your information. We believe you told us 
everything you know. But, your information is not particularly 
useful to us. Have a nice day.”  
This too may have an unfortunate effect. Understanding that 
unless they have information that will actually help the 
government, cooperating defendants may yield to the pressure 
and “enhance” the facts to secure a sentencing benefit. Indeed, in 
1998, a panel of the Tenth Circuit held that government offers to 
reduce a cooperating witness’s sentence in return for testimony 
amounted to bribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2).23 The en 
banc Tenth Circuit reversed the panel’s decision24 and no circuit 
has adopted the original panel’s conclusions—but the logic of 
panel’s view, if not the legal basis, is weighty. And every defense 
attorney I have ever spoken to about the process understands this 
powerful incentive to bend the truth.  
Further compounding the troubling effect of this type of 
testimony is the fact that the government will never agree in 
advance to reward the cooperating defendant with a request for a 
lower sentence. Rather, the government waits until after the 
                                                                                                     
 23. See United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1350 (10th Cir. 1998)  
The obvious purpose of the government’s promised actions was to 
reduce [the defendant’s] jail time, and it is difficult to imagine 
anything more valuable than personal physical freedom . . . . Our 
basis for determining these promises were of value is that the record 
indicates [the defendant] subjectively valued them. They were all he 
bargained for in return for his testimony and guilty plea.  
rev’d en banc, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999). Section 201(c)(2) provides in 
pertinent part:  
Whoever directly or indirectly, gives, offers or promises anything of 
value to any person, for or because of the testimony under oath or 
affirmation given or to be given by such person as a witness upon a 
trial, hearing, or other proceeding, before any court . . . . shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.  
18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (2016). 
 24. See United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1298 (1999) (en banc) 
(“We now hold 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) does not apply to the United States or an 
Assistant United States Attorney functioning within the official scope of the 
office.”). 
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cooperator has pleaded guilty and testified. This puts additional 
pressure on the testifying cooperator to please the government. 
The unbalanced bargaining table is tilted yet further, as 
mentioned before, by the fact that the prosecutor holds enormous 
power to shape the battleground before the fight even starts. The 
prosecution may select the most punitive of available charges and 
threaten further sentencing increases with claims of gun 
possession, inflated drug weights, or alleged acts of obstruction. 
Factors such as these can greatly impact the sentencing range 
under the guidelines.25  
These pressures are in the great number of cases too much to 
bear, particularly when the defendant is young and scared. Better 
to take the plea and hope the government rewards the defendant 
with a request for a sentence reduction or with some other 
concession concerning sentencing factors. This is the point when 
appeal waiver provisions come into play.  
The vast number of plea bargains in the federal system are 
known as “non-binding.”26 This means that even when the parties 
                                                                                                     
 25. It must be noted that in United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court 
ruled that the mandatory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines was 
unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment. See United States v. Booker, 543 
U.S. 220, 266 (2005) (ruling that the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory). While 
this was a welcomed change, the guidelines still exist and are still the required 
framework for devising a sentence, but they are no longer mandatory. Judges 
must still compute a defendant’s guidelines. Judges are free, however, to 
sentence above or below the guidelines (called a “variance” from the guidelines). 
But in practice, most judges still sentence within the guidelines range. All the 
ways the charging decision and application of various sentencing factors can 
shape the sentence still exist, as does Section 5K1.1 (the “substantial 
assistance” provision). See supra note 16 and accompanying discussion 
(outlining factors the court may take into consideration when departing from 
the guidelines). 
 26. For example, Rule 11(c)(1)(B) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
states that in the plea agreement the prosecution may: 
recommend, or agree not to oppose the defendant’s request, that a 
particular sentence or sentencing range is appropriate or that a 
particular provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, or policy 
statement, or sentencing factor does or does not apply (such a 
recommendation or request does not bind the court) . . . . 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(B). Compare this with Rule 11(c)(1)(C), which states 
that the prosecution may: 
agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate 
disposition of the case, or that a particular provision of the 
Sentencing Guidelines, or policy statement, or sentencing factor does 
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agree that a certain sentencing range under the Sentencing 
Guidelines is the appropriate one, or that certain enhancements 
like leadership role or obstruction do not apply, the court is not 
bound by those agreements. If the court concludes, for example, 
that the defendant is responsible for five kilograms of cocaine 
rather than the two kilograms to which the government and the 
defense have agreed, the court will sentence the defendant based 
on the higher weight. In my experience, if the prosecution and the 
defense agree on sentencing factors, most courts will abide by 
that agreement—but not always. It certainly has happened that a 
defendant who was told he will likely receive a sentence of, say 
sixty months—a sentence the government and the defense have 
“agreed upon”—gets a sentence of ninety months instead.  
It is often the case as well that the government and the 
defense will agree to disagree about the application of a 
particular sentencing factor. The plea bargain will note such a 
disagreement and that the issue is for the court to resolve. For 
example, the defendant may claim that his criminal history score 
is less than what the government believes it is. This is not an 
uncommon occurrence, both because the rules for determining 
this score are complex and because the case law interpreting 
those rules diverges in different directions.27 In another example, 
the defense and the prosecution may disagree about whether the 
sentencing range should increase because the defendant used a 
“special skill” in committing the crime. Again, the rules can be 
read in different ways and the cases interpreting those rules have 
led to varying results.28  
The sentencing court’s resolution of these disagreements can 
have a huge impact on a sentence. This is when the unfairness of 
                                                                                                     
or does not apply (such a recommendation or request binds the court 
once the court accepts the plea agreement). 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C). 
 27. See, e.g., Michael Edmund O’Neill, Abraham’s Legacy: An Empirical 
Assessment of (Nearly) First-Time Offenders in the Federal System, 42 B.C. L. 
REV. 291, 301 (2001) (providing background on the criminal history category 
system and its role the Sentencing Guidelines). 
 28. For a general discussion of the developments regarding the role of the 
criminal history category in the Sentencing Guidelines, see Sentencing, 45 GEO. 
L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 787, 788 n.2121 (presenting a multitude of cases in 
which defendants disputed the classification and effects of their criminal history 
categories on appeal).  
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the plea bargaining process comes home to roost. When a 
defendant has been coerced into waiving his appellate rights as a 
result of the government’s insistence—backed up by the threat of 
an enormous sentence if the case is tried, and prodded by the 
hope of a sentence reduction if there is an agreement—the 
defendant has no recourse. What may in fact be an illegal 
sentence, or an inappropriate sentence, will be the final sentence. 
There will be no review by an appellate court. Case closed.  
This result is not what Congress intended. Congress 
explicitly provided for sentence appeals in 18 U.S.C. § 3742.29 
Section 3742 represents a departure from the longstanding 
understanding that there is no appeal from a guilty plea. This 
makes all the sense in the world. As Ms. Minix has noted, the 
vast number of criminal cases are resolved by guilty pleas. Trials 
are rare. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently opined about the 
central role of plea bargaining in today’s world when it noted that 
[n]inety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four 
percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas. The 
reality is that plea bargains have become so central to the 
administration of the criminal justice system that defense 
counsel have responsibilities in the plea bargain process, 
responsibilities that must be met to render the adequate 
assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment requires in 
the criminal process at critical stages. Because ours “is for the 
most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials,” Lafler v. 
Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 157 (2012), it is insufficient simply to 
point to the guarantee of a fair trial as a backstop that 
inoculates any errors in the pretrial process. “To a large 
extent . . . horse trading [between prosecutor and defense 
counsel] determines who goes to jail and for how long. That is 
what plea bargaining is. It is not some adjunct to the criminal 
justice system; it is the criminal justice system.” Scott & 
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L.J. 1909, 1912 
(1992). See also Barkow, Separation of Powers and the 
Criminal Law, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 989, 1034 (2006) 
(“[Defendants] who do take their case to trial and lose receive 
longer sentences than even Congress or the prosecutor might 
think appropriate, because the longer sentences exist on the 
books largely for bargaining purposes. This often results in 
individuals who accept a plea bargain receiving shorter 
                                                                                                     
 29. See supra note 5 and accompanying discussion (detailing the provisions 
in Section 3742).  
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sentences than other individuals who are less morally culpable 
but take a chance and go to trial”). In today’s criminal justice 
system, therefore, the negotiation of a plea bargain, rather 
than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical point 
for a defendant.30 
This language is a blunt and stunning recognition that plea 
bargaining is central to our system of justice, and that trials are 
no longer the backstop against errors in charging a citizen. 
Particularly chilling is the recognition that “longer sentences 
exist on the books largely for bargaining purposes.”31 
It is therefore essential that the appellate courts become the 
backstop for the plea bargaining process when it has failed the 
defendant. The obvious and easiest step is to agree that waivers 
of the right to appeal a sentence ought to be banned. In such a 
world, the concerns identified by Ms. Minix, as well as her 
suggested solution—an excellent and required improvement 
under the current regime—fall by the wayside. 
This is not an argument that appellate courts should become 
an independent sentencing body. Rather, it is only an argument 
that review of a sentence claimed to be inappropriate, or claimed 
to be flawed under some provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, 
ought to be heard by an appellate court (as Congress has already 
decided) rather than cast aside because of a provision in the plea 
agreement demanded by the prosecution. Given the vast power of 
the prosecution, waivers of the right to appeal a sentence are 
easily seen as contracts of adhesion. Such waivers in the era of 
plea-bargained justice ought to be banned as contrary to basic 
fairness. Where plea bargaining is the new trial, the result of that 
trial ought to be reviewable when a defendant claims it was 
erroneous. 
Several lower courts have already taken a step in this 
direction. In United States v. Mutschler,32 the court refused to 
accept a unilateral appellate waiver, finding that it was 
                                                                                                     
 30. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143–44 (2012) (ruling that defense 
counsel has a duty to relay a plea offer to a defendant because of the widespread 
reliance on plea bargaining). 
 31. Id. 
 32. 152 F. Supp. 3d 1332 (W.D. Wash. 2016). 
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unenforceable as contrary to public policy. The court cited United 
States v. Ready33 and noted 
[u]nlike a contemporaneous waiver (for example, the waiver of 
the right to remain silent that occurs when a defendant 
speaks, or the waiver of the right to have a jury determine 
guilt that occurs when a defendant admits guilt), a prospective 
waiver raises concerns about the facts known to the defendant 
at the time the waiver is executed. Generally, when a guilty 
plea is entered and the right to appeal the ensuing sentence is 
waived, the scope of the record that will be considered at 
sentencing has not yet been defined, the presentence report 
has not yet been prepared, the applicable USSG range has not 
yet been calculated, and the sentence has not yet been 
imposed. Given the quantum of information usually 
unavailable at the time of the plea, a prospective waiver of 
appellate rights might often be unknowing and unintelligent.34  
The Mutschler court went on to note that unilateral appellate 
waivers distort the process. Courts are not infallible, and, as the 
court stated, “[t]he criminal justice system is not improved by 
insulating from review either simple miscalculations or novel 
questions of law.”35 Moreover, 
[i]n the wake of Booker, which rendered the sentencing 
guidelines merely advisory, we have returned to a sentencing 
regime with the potential to generate the types of 
unwarranted disparities that Congress attempted to eradicate 
in enacting the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. Only appellate 
courts have the vantage necessary to assess whether sentences 
are being imposed in a uniform manner within a circuit or 
across the country; however, the habitual acceptance and 
enforcement of unilateral waivers of appellate rights precludes 
such analysis, and is likely to lead to a wide range of 
sentences, despite similarities in offense levels and criminal 
histories. This “systemic distortion” is further intensified by 
the “asymmetry” in appellate rights, which allows the 
Government to seek harsher sentences on review, and results 
                                                                                                     
 33. See 82 F.3d 551, 559 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[C]ourts may apply general 
fairness principles to invalidate particular terms of a plea agreement.”). 
 34. Mutschler, 152 F. Supp. 3d at 1338–39 (quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
 35. Id. at 1339. 
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in jurisprudence necessarily “skewed” toward restricting the 
ways in which district courts may show leniency.36 
Likewise, in United States v. Johnson,37 the court refused to 
accept a unilateral appeal waiver. The court noted that 
[a]s a practical matter, the government has bargaining power 
utterly superior to that of the average defendant if only 
because the precise charge or charges to be brought—and thus 
the ultimate sentence to be imposed under the guidelines 
scheme—is up to the prosecution. To vest in the prosecutor 
also the power to require the waiver of appeal rights is to add 
that much more unconstitutional weight to the prosecutor’s 
side of the balance.38  
To conclude, the distortions in the criminal justice system 
caused by the vastly superior bargaining power of the prosecution 
are further warped by denying the defendant the ability to appeal 
a flawed or otherwise unexpected sentence. The practice of 
demanding sentencing appellate waivers is unfair, unwise, and 
unjust. 
                                                                                                     
 36. Id. at 1339–40 (citations omitted). 
 37. 992 F. Supp. 437 (D.D.C. 1997). 
 38. Id. at 439–40. 
